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This paper studies the effects of distortionary taxes and public investment in an
endogenous growth OLG model with knowledge transmission. Fiscal policy
affects growth in two respects: ﬁrst, work time reacts to variations of prospective
tax rates and modiﬁes knowledge formation; second, public spending enhances
labour efﬁciency but also stimulates physical capital through increased savings. It
is shown that Ramsey-optimal policies reduce savings due to high tax rates on
young generations, and are not necessarily growth-improving with respect to a
pure private system. Non-Ramsey policies that shift the burden on adults are
always growth-improving due to crowding-in effects: the welfare of all genera-
tions is unambiguously higher with respect to a private system, and there gen-
erally exists a continuum of non-optimal tax rates under which long-run growth
and welfare are higher than with the Ramsey-optimal policy.
Keywords: endogenous growth, human capital, overlapping generations, tax
policy, public investment.
JEL Classiﬁcation: E62, O41, O11.
1 Introduction
After Lucas’ (1988) seminal contribution, the view that human capital
formation drives economic development inspired a huge body of litera-
ture on endogenous growth. Several authors investigated the sources of
knowledge accumulation at both theoretical and empirical levels,
emphasising the role of educational attainment and knowledge spillovers
in raising aggregate productivity (Benhabib and Spiegel, 1994). Empirical
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evidence suggests that monetary investments in education, and public
spending in particular, are also relevant in determining the accumulation
rate of human capital (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995).1 However, the link
between taxation, public investment in education, and knowledge trans-
mission, has not been fully analysed at the theoretical level. Several
recent studies analyse the growth effects of taxation in Lucas-type settings
with overlapping generations, where knowledge transmission determines
an intergenerational externality. This literature typically assumes that
study time affects knowledge through a learning process: given a ﬁnite
amount of time to be allocated between studying and working, individual
choices determine a tradeoff between human and physical capital accu-
mulation at the aggregate level (see, e.g., De Gregorio, 1996; Yakita,
2003). In fact, some recent contributions also include educational
expenditures in the learning process, and analyse the long-run effects of
alternative policies by means of simulations using computable general
equilibrium models (Docquier and Michel, 1999; Hendricks, 1999;
Bouzahzah et al., 2002). However, most analytical results on the growth
effects of taxation rule out productive educational expenditures:
Bovenberg and van Ewijk (1997), Meijdam (1998), Heijdra and Ligthart
(2000), and Yakita (2003) examine long-run distortions induced by taxing
capital and labor incomes without assuming labor-enhancing monetary
investment.2
This paper studies the effects of alternative tax policies when both study
time and educational expenditure improve human capital formation. In this
setting, ﬁscal policy inﬂuences long-run growth through two channels: (i)
the reallocation of time between studying and working induced by vari-
ations of prospective tax rates, and (ii) the link between educational
spending, private savings and knowledge accumulation. With respect to
Bovenberg and van Ewijk (1997), Meijdam (1998), and Yakita (2003),
mechanism (ii) is peculiar to this model, since public spending may imply
1 According to the cross-country analysis by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995,
chap.13), a 1.5 percent increase in the public education spending-GDP ratio
would have raised the average growth rate by 0.3 percent per year in the period
1965–1975.
2 An exception is Buiter and Kletzer (1995): the authors study the effects of
borrowing constraints when private and public spending in education are perfect
substitutes.
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substantial crowding-in effects. It is shown that these two mechanisms
imply an inverted-U relation between long-run growth and the second-
period tax rate. The reason for this result is that the amount of study time
and the asymptotic savings rate react in opposite ways to balanced vari-
ations of tax rates: taxing young individuals increases study time but
lowers savings by reducing disposable income; conversely, taxing adults
boosts physical capital accumulation. The implication of the inverted-U
relation is that any growth rate (except the unique maximum level) is
associated with opposite ﬁnancing strategies: ‘‘taxing the young’’ or
‘‘taxing adults’’.
Building on this result, we analyse alternative tax policies and discuss
their implications in terms of growth, welfare and intergenerational
equity. The typical starting point is to characterise Ramsey-optimal pol-
icies, i.e., policies that implement the intertemporal allocation which
maximises social welfare, according to the standard utilitarian social
welfare function. It is shown that Ramsey-optimal policies imply high
taxation in the ﬁrst period of life, and may be growth-improving with
respect to a pure private system, depending on parameter values. A
crucial role is played by the relative share of physical capital in pro-
duction: high tax rates on young generations reduce savings, implying
higher (lower) growth rates and welfare levels in the long run if
crowding-out effects are weak (strong) enough.
Considering alternative tax rules, it is shown that crowding-in effects
are important when the government pursues the opposite ﬁnancing
strategy, i.e., ‘‘taxing adults’’: shifting the burden from the ﬁrst to the
second period of life allows sustaining growth and welfare through
increased savings. In particular, tax rates may be adjusted so that work
time of young agents is the same as without public intervention: under
this labor-neutral policy, growth and welfare are always higher with
respect to a pure private system, irrespective of the parameter values.
As a consequence, labour-neutral policies may increase long-run
growth and preserve welfare of later generations when compared with
Ramsey-optimal policies.
Furthermore, the inverted-U relation between growth and
second-period tax rates allows us to characterise a growth-equivalent
policy under which the asymptotic growth rate equals that obtained under
Ramsey-optimal taxation. This implies that there generally exists a set of
policies yielding higher growth and increased saving rates in the long run
than those observed under Ramsey-optimal taxation.
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2 The Model
The analysis employs an overlapping-generations model where human
capital accumulation is enhanced by monetary investment in education. In
order to assess the effects of ﬁscal policy more neatly, the dynamic path
experienced in a pure public regime – where education is entirely
ﬁnanced by the government – is compared with that obtained in a pure
private regime, where young individuals pay their own education costs.
Although the analysis is connected with the literature on growth and
education ﬁnancing (Glomm and Ravikumar, 1992; Eckstein and Zilcha,
1994; De Gregorio and Kim, 2000), the aim of this paper is not to discuss
the desirability of a particular school system, but rather to describe the
intergenerational consequences of alternative ﬁnancing strategies within
the public regime: the private system will be thought of as a comparable
benchmark economy, by means of which the implications of different tax
rules for growth and welfare can be discussed.
Consider two economies indexed by i ¼ A, B, with identical
technologies, preferences, initial endowments, and a constant population
of consumer-workers who live for two periods. In period t there are n
young and n adult individuals, and each young individual inherits own
knowledge from the current state of the economy. Knowledge is repre-
sented by h
i
, measured in terms of labor-efﬁciency units. Individuals are
endowed with one unit of time: in the ﬁrst period of life a fraction (1 ‘it)
is devoted to study, and ‘it
h
i
t labor units are supplied for production. In the
second period, individuals only work, and consume all their income.3 The
level of efﬁciency achieved at the beginning of the second period of life
depends on study time and school quality Ei, according to the learning
technology
h
i
tþ1 ¼ hituit; ð1Þ
uit ¼ W 1 ‘it
 e
Eit
 g
; i ¼ A;B; ð2Þ
3 A relevant issue not addressed in this paper is the interplay between edu-
cation ﬁnancing and pension funding, which would require including a third
period of life in which agents only consume. While a three-period version would
require numerical solutions, the basic two-period setup employed here allows to
obtain analytical results on crowding-in effects, ﬁlling the gap in previous liter-
ature. Extending the model to include pensions is nonetheless an interesting topic
which deserves further research.
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where W > 0 is a proportionality factor, u exhibits decreasing returns in
both arguments (0 < e < 1, 0 < g < 1) and non-increasing returns to
scale (eþ g  1). Aggregate human capital H is the amount of labor
supplied by the two generations alive in period t: denoting by hit ¼ nhit the
aggregate amount of knowledge in each generation, human capital at time
t equals Hit ¼ 1þ ‘it
 
hit. Since agents have identical preferences, total
labour supply evolves according to
Hitþ1 ¼ 1þ ‘itþ1
 
hitu
i
t ¼ uitH it 1þ ‘itþ1
 
1þ ‘it
 1
: ð3Þ
Aggregate output (Y ) is produced by means of human and physical
capital (K) according to the production function Y ¼ KaH 1a, with
0 < a < 1. Physical capital fully depreciates during the production pro-
cess. This widely-used assumption is relevant for the analysis: on the one
hand, assuming one-period depreciation of K is reasonable in the present
model – since a ‘‘period’’ corresponds to one half of the individual life
cycle – and it allows us to study dynamics analytically; on the other hand,
the asymmetric treatment of physical and human capital does not nec-
essarily weaken the main results – namely, Propositions 4 and 6 below –
since assuming durable physical capital might emphasise the role of
crowding-in effects in the long run.
Setting k ¼ K=H , the output-human capital ratio y ¼ Y =H equals
yit ¼ kit
 a
: ð4Þ
The production sector behaves like a single competitive ﬁrm: denoting by
w and R the wage rate and the interest factor, respectively, proﬁt maxi-
mization implies
Rit ¼ a Y it =Kit
 
; ð5Þ
wit ¼ 1 að Þ kit
 a
; i ¼ A;B: ð6Þ
Individual consumption is denoted by c when young, and by d when
adult. Preferences are logarithmic and individual lifetime utility U is
Uit ¼ log cit
 þ b log ditþ1
 
; ð7Þ
where b 2 ð0; 1Þ is the private discount factor.
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School quality is indexed by the levels of private and public spending
in education, which are assumed to be equally productive. Economy A is
a pure private system where education costs V are paid by young gen-
erations and there is no public intervention: setting v ¼ V =h, school
quality equals EAt ¼ vt. Economy B is a pure public school system with
total spending in education G ﬁnanced through distortionary taxation:
setting g ¼ G=h yields EBt ¼ gt. In the present context, assuming that
private and public spending are equally productive is formally equivalent
to considering two extreme cases of the general learning technology
u ¼ W 1 ‘ð Þe vþ gð Þg, which represents a mixed school system with v
and g as perfect substitutes.4
Firstly, consider the temporary equilibrium in the private system. In
economy A, each consumer faces the budget constraints
cAt ¼ wAt ‘At hAt  vthAt  sAt ; ð8Þ
dAtþ1 ¼ RAtþ1sAt þ wAtþ1hAtþ1; ð9Þ
where s represents individual savings. Each agent maximises UAt subject
to (8)–(9), using cAt ; d
A
tþ1; ‘
A
t ; vt as control variables, taking w and R as
given. First-order conditions read
RAtþ1w
A
t ¼ uA‘twAtþ1; ð10Þ
RAtþ1 ¼uAvtwAtþ1; ð11Þ
dAtþ1 ¼bcAt RAtþ1: ð12Þ
Denote aggregate savings by St ¼ nst and set SAt  KAtþ1. Substituting
equilibrium prices (5)–(6) and the ﬁrst-order conditions in individual
budget constraints gives the accumulation rule
kAtþ1 ¼
ð1 aÞ ‘At ð1þ bgþ beÞ  1 bg
 
eð1þ bÞ 1þ ‘Atþ1
 
uAt
yAt : ð13Þ
4 Assuming that v and g are equally productive is not particularly restrictive
here. Since we analyse alternative public policies using the private system as a
comparable benchmark economy, ruling out perfect substitutability would ‘‘[. . .]
create a role for government in human capital formation that is too straightfor-
ward’’ because it ‘‘would add to the algebra without qualitatively changing the
effects of public spending on human capital formation and private ﬁnancial
saving’’ (Buiter and Kletzer, 1995, p. S168; our italics).
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The optimal amount of work time supplied by young generations deter-
mines, together with (13), the temporary equilibrium of the economy,
which is deﬁned at given expectations over the future interest rate and the
future employment level. When there is a tradeoff between studying and
working, it is possible to obtain stationary solutions, where work time
jumps at the equilibrium level ‘? in period zero and is constant thereafter
(De Gregorio, 1996; de la Croix and Michel, 2002). In our model, the
assumed learning technology (2) implies a stationary solution (all proofs
are in the Appendix):
Lemma 1: In the private education regime, work time supplied by young
generations is equal to the optimal level ‘A? in each period, with
‘A? ¼ ð1=2Þ 1 eqA  pA þ
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1 eqA  pAð Þ2þ4pA
q 
; ð14Þ
‘A? > ‘
A
min ¼
1þ bg
1þ beþ bg : ð15Þ
Coefﬁcients qA > 0 and pA > 1 in eq.(14) are constant parameters, and
the lower bound ‘Amin is the minimum amount of work time compatible
with positive savings, see Eq. (13). Denoting the private propensity to
spend in education as qAt ¼ (vt=yAt ), condition (11) can be rewritten as
vt ¼ qAt yAt ¼
g
e
1 að Þ 1 ‘A?
 
yAt : ð16Þ
Hence, the optimal propensity is time-invariant, and the accumulation
rule (13) may be rewritten as
kAtþ1 ¼ zA yAt
 1g¼ zA kAt
 að1gÞ
; ð17Þ
where the accumulation rate z is constant and equal to
zA ¼ ð1 aÞ ‘
A
? ð1þ bgþ beÞ  1 bg
 
eð1þ bÞ 1þ ‘A?
 
W 1 ‘A?
 e
qAð Þg : ð18Þ
Since að1 gÞ < 1, the physical-human capital ratio converges to a
steady-state level in the long run.
In the public regime (economy B), the government imposes propor-
tional taxes on labour incomes, and individual budget constraints read
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cBt ¼ wBt ‘Bt hBt 1 xtð Þ  sBt ; ð19Þ
dBtþ1 ¼ RBtþ1sBt þ wBtþ1hBtþ1 1 htþ1ð Þ; ð20Þ
where x and h are proportional tax rates on labour earnings in the ﬁrst and
in the second period of life, respectively.5 The government keeps a bal-
anced budget in each period:
gthBt ¼ wBt hBt ht þ xt‘Bt
 
: ð21Þ
Individuals anticipate tax rates with perfect foresight and maximize UBt
subject to (19)–(20) using cBt ; d
B
t , and ‘
B
t as control variables. First-order
conditions are
RBtþ1w
B
t 1 xtð Þ ¼ uB‘twBtþ1 1 htþ1ð Þ; ð22Þ
dBtþ1 ¼ bcBt RBtþ1: ð23Þ
Since there is no public debt, net investment equals aggregate savings and
the accumulation rule of the economy is
kBtþ1 ¼
1 að Þ ‘Bt ð1þ beÞ  1
 
1 xtð Þ
eð1þ bÞ 1þ ‘Btþ1
 
uBt
yBt : ð24Þ
Substituting condition (22) in (24) yields
‘Btþ1 ¼
‘Bt
1 ‘Bt
eqBtþ1  pBtþ1; ð25Þ
qBtþ1 ¼ bð1 aÞðaþ abÞ1 1 htþ1ð Þ; ð26Þ
pBtþ1 ¼ 1þ ð1 aÞðaþ abÞ1 1 htþ1ð Þ: ð27Þ
5 On the one hand, allowing tax rates to differ between generations ensures that
the Ramsey-optimal allocation can be implemented through instruments x , q and
h as shown in Sect. 3.1. On the other hand, x and h may be interpreted in terms of
net marginal burdens without loss of generality: this reﬂects the possibility for the
government to implement age-uniform ﬂat tax rates on income together with
public policies that modify ex-post ﬁscal wedges. These intergenerational dis-
tortions arise, for example, when the government combines income taxes with
subsidies a la Docquier and Michel (1999), i.e., monetary subsidies that relieve
the opportunity cost of studying when young agents seek higher education and/or
skill-enhancing training.
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Expressions (25)–(26)–(27) show that ‘B depends on prospective tax
rates. In particular, when ht is kept constant, public regimes also exhibit
stationary work time:
Lemma 2: If ht ¼ h in each period, work time of young generations in
the public regime equals ‘B? in each period, where
‘B? ¼ ð1=2Þ 1 eqB  pB þ
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1 eqB  pBð Þ2þ4pB
q 
; ð28Þ
‘B? > ‘
B
min ¼
1
1þ be : ð29Þ
When both tax rates are time-invariant, the economy converges to the
balanced growth path: denoting the public propensity to spend in edu-
cation by qBt ¼ (gt=yBt ) and setting xt ¼ x and ht ¼ h in the government
budget constraint, the accumulation rule (24) becomes
kBtþ1 ¼ zB yBt
 1g¼ zB kBt
 að1gÞ
; ð30Þ
zB ¼ ð1 aÞ 1þ beð Þ  ‘
B
? ðhÞ  1
 ð1 xÞ
eð1þ bÞ 1þ ‘B? ðhÞ
 
W 1 ‘B? ðhÞ
 e
qBð Þg : ð31Þ
In the public regime, the effects of ﬁscal policy crucially depend on how
second-period tax rates modify the intersectoral allocation of time
between studying and working for young agents. These time-reallocation
effects can be described by considering ‘B? as a function of h, which yields
the following results:
Proposition 3: Work time ‘B? depends on h with the following properties:
(i) @@h ‘
B
? ðhÞ > 0; limh!1 ‘
B
? ðhÞ ¼ 1; limh!1 ‘
B
? ðhÞ ¼ ‘Bmin;
(ii) there exists a unique h such that ‘B? ðhÞ ¼ ‘A? ;
(iii) h > 0;
(iv) ‘B? ð0Þ < ‘A? :
Property (i) is intuitive: lowering second-period tax rates induces young
agents to study more and devote less time to work; heavily taxing adults
forces individuals to work in the ﬁrst period of life, in order to accumulate
savings and rely on capital income in the second period. Symmetrically,
Tax Policy and Human Capital Formation with Public 237
subsidising adult generations reduces work time, bringing ‘B? towards the
lower bound. Properties (ii)–(iii) deﬁne a critical tax rate: setting ht ¼ h in
each period, work time is the same in the two regimes. We will refer to h
as the labor-neutral tax rate, which is strictly positive by (iii). Property
(iv) establishes that setting ht ¼ 0 implies lower work time in the public
school regime.6
From(17)and(30), thephysical-humancapital ratioandtheoutput-human
capital ratio in both regimes converge to
lim
t!1 k
i
t ¼ kiss ¼ zi
  1
1að1gÞ; lim
t!1 y
i
t ¼ yiss ¼ zi
  a
1að1gÞ; ð32Þ
long-run growth is determined by the learning technology
lim
t!1 Y
i
tþ1=Y
i
t
  ¼ uiss ¼ W 1 ‘i?
 e
qiyiss
 g
; ð33Þ
and accumulation rates equal, by (10) and (22),
zA ¼ a=eWð Þ qA g 1 ‘A?
 1e
; ð34Þ
zB ¼ a=eWð Þ qB g 1 ‘B? ðhÞ
 1e 1 x
1 h
 	
: ð35Þ
Equation (35) shows that ﬁscal policy effectiveness depends on the
intertemporal allocation of education costs, which is determined in the
public regime by the tax ratio 1 xð Þð1 hÞ1. Therefore, ﬁscal policy
may affect growth and welfare through two channels: on the one hand,
study time can be increased by reducing second-period tax rates; on the
other hand, ﬁrst-period tax rates and public spending may increase long-
run growth by raising the accumulation rate. This dichotomy is crucial for
results presented in the next section.
As regardswelfare, individual lifetimeutility inperiod t is the sumof three
components (see Appendix):
Uit ¼ Ki þ ð1þ abÞ log kitþ1 þ ð1þ bÞ
Xt
j¼0
loguij; i ¼ A;B: ð36Þ
6 Work time in the public system does not depend on the marginal effect of
expenditures on learning (coefﬁcient pA depends on g, whereas pB does not – see
Appendix). This implies that work time differs in the two regimes when h ¼ 0.
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The static term K depends on initial endowments and work time. The
accumulation term varies only in the short run and converges to
ð1þ abÞ log kiss. The last term in (36), instead, grows indeﬁnitely,
implying that individual welfare exhibits a positive time-trend over
generations: for t and t0 large enough with t > t0, the growth term can be
rewritten as
ð1þ bÞ
Xt
j¼0
loguij  ð1þ bÞ
Xt0
j¼0
loguij þ t  t0ð Þð1þ bÞ loguiss: ð37Þ
Expression (37) shows that the effects of knowledge transmission dom-
inate, in terms of welfare levels, the static term K in the long run.
3 Tax Policy Analysis
This section studies how the relation between taxation and growth is
inﬂuenced by time-reallocation and crowding-in effects. The analysis is
positive in spirit, and describes the implications for growth and welfare
of alternative tax policies. A policy is deﬁned as a sequence
fqBt ; xt; htg implemented by ﬁscal authorities over the whole time-
horizon t ¼ 0; . . . ;1. Since there are three policy instruments, it is
convenient to restrict the analysis to a subset of issues related to tax
policy, focusing on the growth effects of alternative ways to ﬁnance
public investment. Speciﬁcally, we ﬁx instrument qB by assuming that
the public propensity to spend is maintained at the efﬁcient level, and
study the growth scenarios implied by different combinations of tax
rates. This procedure allows us to describe the implications of re-
distributing the burden of education across the individual life-cycle
according to different criteria. Since any value of h corresponds to a
unique feasible level of work time, qB and x are associated to each
possible h as follows:
qBðhÞ ¼ ge1ð1 aÞ 1 ‘B? ðhÞ
 
; ð38Þ
xðhÞ ¼ ge
1 1 ‘B? ðhÞ
  h
‘B? ðhÞ
: ð39Þ
Equation (38) is formally analogous to the optimality condition obtained
for the private propensity and represents the efﬁcient public propensity to
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spend (Sect. 3.1 shows that (38) indeed characterizes Ramsey-optimal
allocations). Expression (39) deﬁnes the unique value of x consistent with
the budget constraint. The next section describes the Ramsey-optimal
policy, which implies a high tax rate for young individuals. Section 3.2
investigates the consequences of alternative policies that shift the burden
from the ﬁrst to the second period of life.
3.1 Ramsey-optimal Policy
The Ramsey-optimal policy is deﬁned according to the standard criterion:
a hypothetical central planner seeks the sequence of consumption levels,
work time and school quality fct ; dt ; ‘t ;Et g that maximizes the dis-
counted sum of lifetime utilities7
! ¼
X1
t¼0
nUt log ct þ b log dtþ1ð Þ; ð40Þ
where U 2 ð0; 1Þ is the social discount factor, subject to the transition law
of human knowledge (1)–(2), and to the aggregate resource constraint
of the economy
Ktþ1 ¼ Kat ht 1þ ‘tð Þ½ 1anct  ndt  Etht; ð41Þ
taking initial endowments (h0, K0) as given. The solution of the social
problem determines the Ramsey-optimal allocation, and a Ramsey-optimal
policy is a sequence of ﬁscal instruments fqt ; xt ; ht g that implements such
an allocation. This requires to set tax rates and the public spending ratio
gt  EBt in order to satisfy the government budget constraint and the
optimality conditions of the centralised problem. Formally, the following
relations must hold in each period (see Appendix):
qBt ¼
g
e
ð1 aÞ 1 ‘Bt
 
; ð42Þ
qBt ¼ ð1 aÞ ht þ xt‘Bt
 
; ð43Þ
1 htþ1
1 xt ¼ 1þ
1
e
1 g ð1 e gÞ  ‘Btþ1
 
: ð44Þ
7 Note that we are not assuming exante that qB is kept at an efﬁcient level: in
this subsection, Eq. (38) is derived from the maximisation process.
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Equation (42) is the efﬁcient public propensity to spend in education,
which indeed veriﬁes (38); Eq. (43) is the government budget constraint;
imposing the equality between market factor prices (wBt , R
B
t ) and optimal
marginal productivities yields Eq. (44).
There is a unique Ramsey-optimal policy compatible with convergence
towards balanced growth, which features constant tax rates. The constant
tax rate h satisfying conditions (42)–(44) is recursively determined by
the system
1 h
1 x ¼ / h
ð Þ; ð45Þ
x ¼ x hð Þ; ð46Þ
q ¼ qB hð Þ; ð47Þ
where x hð Þ and qB hð Þ are deﬁned by (38)–(39), and8
/ðhÞ ¼ 1
e
e 1þ ‘B? ðhÞ
 þ ð1 gÞ 1 ‘B? ðhÞ
  
> 1: ð48Þ
It derives from / > 1 that individuals are taxed more heavily in their ﬁrst
period of life: for example, when the learning technology exhibits con-
stant returns to scale, eþ g ¼ 1, Ramsey-optimal taxation implies
/ hð Þ ¼ 2. More generally, with non-increasing returns to scale
(eþ g  1) the following results hold:
Proposition 4: Under the Ramsey-optimal policy q; x; hf g, work time
is lower in the public regime, and public propensity to spend in education
is higher than private propensity:
‘B? h
ð Þ < ‘A? ; ð49Þ
q > qA: ð50Þ
Proposition 4 can be interpreted as follows. In the private regime, individual
study time and expenditures in education are belowRamsey-optimal levels,
because ﬁnitely-lived selﬁsh agents do not fully internalize the beneﬁts of
knowledge transmission. Ramsey-optimal policies cure this market
8 Equation (48) can be rewritten as / ¼ 1þ ‘B? hð Þ þ 1ge
 
1 ‘B? hð Þ
  
,
where the term in square brackets is strictly positive, implying / > 1.
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incompleteness by increasing study time and the propensity to spend in
education. However, the associated tax burden falls heavily on young
workers (/ > 1),whereas adults are generally subsidized.9 High tax rates on
youngagents, lowwork time,andhighpropensity tospendineducationdrive
down the long-run saving rate, which is generally higher in the private sys-
tem:
Lemma 5: Under the Ramsey-optimal policy q; x; hf g, the accumu-
lation rate zB is strictly lower than zA if either eþ g ¼ 1, or eþ g < 1
with a sufﬁciently low work time gap ‘A?  ‘B? hð Þ.
Proof: Lemma 5 is proved as follows: from Eqs. (34), (35), and (45),
zA
zB hð Þ ¼ / h
ð Þ  1 ‘
A
?
1 ‘B? hð Þ
 	1eg
: ð51Þ
If eþ g ¼ 1 the term in round-brackets equals unity, and / ¼ 2 implies
zA > zB hð Þ. If eþ g < 1, expression (51) yields zA > zB hð Þ provided
the term in round-brackets (below unity) is more than offset by / > 1:(
These results imply that Ramsey-optimal policies generally involve
crowding-out of physical capital, which inﬂuences knowledge formation
via public spending. In terms of growth rates, the negative effect on
savings can be offset by the beneﬁts of human capital formation: the
asymptotic growth ratio equals10
uAss=u
B
ss
  ¼ / hð Þ ag1að1gÞ 1 ‘
A
?
1 ‘B? hð Þ
 eþgþagð1egÞ
1að1gÞ
; ð52Þ
where the term in square brackets is always below unity. Whether the
whole expression is below unity depends on the parameters, and
9 It can be shown that h < 0 obtains when bg < 0:5 in the general case
eþ g  1. Moreover, bg < 0:5 is not strictly necessary to have h < 0: for
example, when eþ g ¼ 1 it follows from / ¼ 2 that adults are subsidised
whenever x < 0:5, which is always the case in our simulations.
10 Substituting (32) in (33) yields uiss ¼ W 1 ‘i?
 e
qið Þg zið Þ
ag
1að1gÞ. Substitut-
ing (16) and (34) in this expression gives uAss, while substituting q
 ¼ qB hð Þ and
(35) yields uBss. Taking the ratio and substituting (45) gives ( 52).
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simulations suggest that the relative share a plays a crucial role in this
regard. Low values of a tend to reduce the negative impact of crowding-
out effects on uBss h
ð Þ because the relative importance of K in production
is limited. Conversely, high values of a strengthen crowding-out effects,
and Ramsey-optimal taxation is more likely to be growth-reducing with
respect to a pure private system. For example, setting e ¼ g ¼ 0:5 and
b ¼ 0:8 implies uAss=uBss ¼ 0:946 for a ¼ 0:4, whereas setting a ¼ 0:6
ceteris paribus yields uAss=u
B
ss ¼ 1:052.
Labor-neutral
Labor-neutral Private system
Private system Ramsey-optimal
Ramsey-optimal
a = 0.6a = 0.4
Graph (a)
Private System Private System
Graph (b)
Ut Ut
t Labor-Neutral Ramsey-Optimal
0 9.694 9.696 10.084
1 11.526 11.639 12.021
2 13.374 13.592 13.974
3 15.226 15.548 15.932
4 17.079 17.504 17.890
5 18.932 19.460 19.849
6 20.785 21.416 21.808
7 22.638 23.372 23.767
8 24.491 25.328 25.725
9 26.344 27.284 27.684
10 28.196 29.240 29.643
11 30.049 31.196 31.602
12 31.902 33.152 33.561
13 33.755 35.108 35.519
14 35.608 37.064 37.478
15 37.461 39.020 39.437
16 39.314 40.976 41.396
17 41.167 42.932 43.355
18 43.020 44.888 45.313
19 44.873 46.844 47.272
20 46.726 48.800 49.231
t
t t
Labor-Neutral Ramsey-Optimal
0 11.545 11.569 12.935
1 13.718 13.832 15.083
2 15.673 15.865 16.948
3 17.588 17.856 18.769
4 19.494 19.835 20.581
5 21.397 21.812 22.391
6 23.299 23.787 24.199
7 25.201 25.762 26.007
8 27.102 27.737 27.815
9 29.004 29.712 29.623
10 30.906 31.687 31.432
11 32.807 33.662 33.240
12 34.709 35.637 35.048
13 36.611 37.612 36.856
14 38.512 39.587 38.664
15 40.414 41.562 40.472
16 42.316 43.537 42.280
17 44.217 45.512 44.088
18 46.119 47.487 45.896
19 48.021 49.462 47.705
20 49.923 51.437 49.513
Fig. 1. Time paths of lifetime utility under different tax policies with b ¼ 0:8,
e ¼ g ¼ 0:5, K0 ¼ 10, h0 ¼ 1. Graph (a) assumes a ¼ 0:4: the Ramsey-optimal
policy improves growth and welfare with respect to both the private system and the
labor-neutral policy (see Fig. 3 for details). Graph (b) assumes a ¼ 0:6: labor-neutral
taxation yields higher long-run growth with respect to both the private system and the
Ramsey-optimal policy; setting W ¼ 230 yields uBssðhÞ ¼ 9:72%, uAss ¼ 5:65%, and
uBss h
ð Þ ¼ 0:45%
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The implications for welfare are as follows. As shown in the previous
section, individual utility levels are crucially determined by the ‘‘growth
term’’ in the long run. Consequently, the welfare gap between the two
regimes, UA  UB, reﬂects the sign of the growth gap uAss  uBss once the
economy has approached balanced growth. Figure 1 shows that for
a ¼ 0:4, utility UB under Ramsey-optimal taxation is always higher than
UA. When a ¼ 0:6, on the other hand, UB > UA only for a ﬁnite number
of periods: in this case, long-run growth rates are such that uAss > u
B
ss h
ð Þ,
and individuals enjoy higher utility from the private system in the long run.
3.2 Alternative Tax Policies
This section studies the effects of alternative policies that shift the tax
burden from the ﬁrst to the second period of life. Firstly, we analyse the
properties of labor-neutral policies: when tax rates are adjusted so that
work time is equal between public and private regimes, economic activity
in the public system is sustained by increased savings through a crowd-
ing-in mechanism, and long-run growth is unambiguously higher than
under the private system regardless of parameter values. This implies that
labor-neutral taxation yields higher growth and long-run welfare than
under the Ramsey-optimal policy when the latter strategy brings intensive
crowding-out. Secondly, we show that there generally exists a set of non-
optimal tax rates yielding higher growth and long-run welfare with
respect to the Ramsey policy, even when the latter strategy is growth-
improving with respect to the private regime.
Labor-neutral taxation. Assume that the government implements
labour-neutral taxation, as deﬁned in Proposition 3. Setting ht ¼ h in each
period, Eqs. (38)–(39) deﬁne a constant propensity q ¼ qBðhÞ, and a
constant tax rate x ¼ xðhÞ on young generations. The properties of the
labor-neutral policy fq;x; hg are summarized in the following
Proposition 6: Under the labor-neutral policy fq;x; hg, young genera-
tions are subsidised (x < 0), the accumulation rate is higher in the public
regime (zB > zA), and public education guarantees higher growth and
welfare at least in the long run (uBss > u
A
ss).
When labor supply effects are neutralised by tax policy, public
education guarantees higher growth. The reason is that x < 0 implies
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higher disposable income for young generations, and higher savings. This
crowding-in effect sustains economic activity by raising the accumulation
rate, which inﬂuences long-run growth through public spending:
z " ) yss " ) qyss  g1  E1 " :
The major point to be emphasized here is that uBssðhÞ unambiguously
exceeds uAss; that is, crowding-in effects yield higher long-run growth
with respect to the private system regardless of parameter values. As
shown in Sect. 3.1, Ramsey-optimal policies do not have this property, as
the sign of the growth gap uAss  uBss crucially depends on the value of a.
Consequently, labor-neutral taxation may yield higher growth and long-
run welfare than Ramsey-optimal taxation: when parameters are such that
uBss h
ð Þ is lower than uAss, Proposition 6 implies uBssðhÞ > uAss > uBss hð Þ.
Put differently, high values of a strengthen not only crowding-out, but
also crowding-in effects, so that shifting the burden onto adult workers
enhances growth when the share of physical capital in production is
relatively high. This is conﬁrmed by the numerical example described in
Fig. 1: consistent with Proposition 6, the labor-neutral policy is welfare-
improving with respect to the private system regardless of the values of a.
When a ¼ 0:4, Ramsey-optimal taxation yields higher utility levels than
labor-neutral taxation, but the opposite result holds setting a ¼ 0:6: from
period t ¼ 9 onwards, labor-neutral taxation implies higher utility than
the Ramsey-optimal policy.
It is important to note that Ramsey-optimal and labor-neutral policies
cannot be Pareto-ranked11. By construction, any policy that shifts the
burden of ﬁrst-period education onto the second period of life implies an
income-redistribution effect that brings welfare losses for adult agents in
period zero. This is a typical ‘‘ﬁrst-father problem’’: public education of
those who are young in t ¼ 0 must be ﬁnanced by a generation which
11 Figure 1 compares different policies in terms of lifetime utility levels.
Alternatively, one might consider present-value streams of utilities yielded by the
same policies, using a predetermined social discount factor. On the one hand, it is
possible to construct ranges of values for U such that welfare gains from non-
Ramsey policies might compensate, in present-value terms, the loss of inter-
temporal efﬁciency over some chosen time interval t0; t1ð Þ, abstracting from the
ﬁrst-father problem. On the other hand, present-value comparisons would not
allow assessing the intergenerational distribution of beneﬁts – which is a major
focus of the analysis – since ‘‘social welfare’’ would in this case be thought of as
a discounted sum over generations.
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does not receive any beneﬁt from the newly-established school system.12
Bearing this in mind, the policy implications of Fig. 1 are nonetheless
interesting: ﬁrst, when crowding-out effects are important, Ramsey-optimal
policies do not preserve the welfare of all generations with respect to a pure
private system, whereas labour-neutral policies always succeed in this
regard. Second, knowledge transmission ampliﬁes the effectiveness of
policies that increase disposable income of savers, with possible gains in
terms of growth and long-run welfare with respect to Ramsey-optimal
taxation.
The growth curve. The labor-neutral policy described above is a peculiar
tax rule which implements the same work time in a public system as in the
private regime. When comparing the effects of alternative strategies for
ﬁnancing public education, this tax rule represents a useful device for
obtaining analytical results on crowding-in effects. However, the role of
crowding-in effects can be assessed in more general terms by considering
the whole set of tax rates that shift the education burden onto adults. That is,
crowding-in effects may be exploited by policies which are not necessarily
labour-neutral, in order to preserve individual welfare of late-in-time gen-
erations. This point can be addressed by studying the relation between
asymptotic growth and the tax rate on adults. Substituting (38) and (39) in
(35), the asymptotic growth rate can be expressed as
ussðhÞ ¼ n 1 ‘B? ðhÞ
 eþgþð1egÞag
1að1gÞ 1 xðhÞ
1 h
 	 ag
1að1gÞ
; ð53Þ
where n is a constant parameter. Expression (53) describes the effects of
taxation on growth in terms of two factors, the level of study time and the tax
ratio ð1 xðhÞÞð1 hÞ1. These terms react in opposite directions as the
tax rate on adults varies: an increase in h implies reduced study time, but also
an increase in the tax ratio.13 Figure 2 shows that the growth curve (53) has
an inverted-U shape, which is explained as follows. From property (i) of
12 The time-path of individual welfare depicted in Fig. 1 refers to lifetime
utility Ut ¼ Uðct; etþ1Þ, so that U0 ¼ Uðc0; e1Þ pertains to those who are young
in period zero. Instead, second-period utility of the ﬁrst generation of fathers,
i.e., those adult at time zero – equals b log e0 and is necessarily higher under
Ramsey-optimal taxation with respect to labor-neutral taxation.
13 Equation (39) implies that x hð Þ is decreasing in h. Therefore, a marginal
increase in h increases the tax ratio in (53).
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Proposition 3, lim
h!1
@‘B? ðhÞ=@h
  ¼ 0. Consequently, the net effect of a
marginal increase dh on long-run growth is positive for low values of h, due
to the increase in the tax ratio. However, for high values of h, the negative
effect on growth of reduced study time dominates at the margin. It is worth
noting that this relation is a peculiar feature of ourmodel, which results from
the assumption of productive public expenditures.
The inverted-U shape of the growth curve implies that there exists a
unique tax rate h^ which maximises long-run growth. Since h^ generally
differs from the Ramsey-optimal rate h, there exists a tax rate hn 6¼ h
yielding a long-run growth rate equal to that obtained under the Ramsey-
optimal policy (see Fig. 2). We will refer to hn as the growth-equivalent
tax rate on adults: using Eqs. (38) and (39), a growth-equivalent policy
fqn; xn; hng is deﬁned by a tax rate on adults hn 6¼ h, an efﬁcient pro-
pensity to spend in education qn ¼ qB hnð Þ, and a balanced tax rate
xn ¼ x hnð Þ, such that uBss hnð Þ ¼ uBss hð Þ. The properties of the growth-
equivalent policy crucially depend on whether h < hn:
Proposition 7: When h < hn, the accumulation rate and the output-hu-
man capital ratio are higher under the growth-equivalent policy if either
eþ g ¼ 1, or eþ g < 1 with a sufﬁciently low work time gap
‘B? h
nð Þ  ‘B? hð Þ:
jss
jss(q )
q q q
q
n∗ Ÿ
Fig. 2. The growth curve (53) is an inverted-U relation between the asymptotic
growth rate and the tax rate on adults. Setting a ¼ 0:4 with the same parameters of
Fig. 1, the Ramsey-optimal tax rate is h ¼ 21:9% and the growth-equivalent rate
is hn ¼ 14:3%. Any value h 2 h; hnð Þ is growth-improving with respect to the
Ramsey-optimal policy
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zB hnð Þ > zB hð Þ; ð54Þ
yBss h
nð Þ > yBss hð Þ: ð55Þ
Figure 2 depicts the case considered in Proposition 7: the Ramsey-
optimal tax rate h lies to the left of the growth-maximizing rate h^,
implying h < h^ < hn. A little algebra shows that h < h^ requires14
1=2 < agð1 aeÞ1 1 ‘B? ðh^Þ

 
 s0h=‘0h
 
: ð56Þ
Condition (56) is always satisﬁed in our simulations with varying
parameters, but analytical proof of its general validity is quite difﬁcult to
obtain. The point is that when (56) is satisﬁed, there exists a continuum of
second-period tax rates that redistribute the burden in favor of young
generations and imply higher growth with respect to the Ramsey-optimal
policy. This continuum is represented by the interval h; hnð Þ, as shown in
Fig. 2.
This result reinforces our previous conclusions about the importance of
crowding-in effects: there generally exists a set of growth-improving tax
rates ~h 2 h; hnð Þ yielding higher long-run growth and welfare with re-
spect to the Ramsey-optimal policy, and this happens even for relatively
low values of a. Figure 3 considers the same parameter values used in
Fig. 1, with a ¼ 0:4. The Ramsey-optimal tax rate is h ¼ 21:9% and
the associated growth-equivalent tax rate is hn ¼ 14:3%. In this case,
labor-neutral taxation is not growth-improving with respect to the Ram-
sey-optimal policy (as shown in Fig. 1) because h ¼ 14:9% > hn.
Choosing a growth-improving tax rate ~h 2 h; hnð Þ, ﬁscal authorities may
redistribute the burden in favor of young generations and obtain
uBss
~h

 
> uBss h
ð Þ. In the numerical example of Fig. 3, we set h ¼ 4%,
which implies higher growth in the long run: consequently, individual
utility levels are above those obtained under the Ramsey-optimal policy
from period t ¼ 8 onwards.
14 For simplicity, (56) is derived with constant returns to scale eþ g ¼ 1. The
left-hand side of (56) is the Ramsey-optimal tax ratio, which equals
1=/ hð Þ ¼ 0:5 by (45). The right-hand side is the growth-maximizing tax ratio,
where s0h is the total derivative of the tax ratio with respect to h, and
‘0h ¼ @‘B? ðhÞ=@h, with s0h and ‘0h both evaluated at h ¼ h^.
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It is worth noting that these results recall the logic of Gale-type
intergenerational transfers. Gale (1973) showed that, for a two-genera-
tions pure exchange economy, the ﬁrst generation can raise future welfare
by renouncing part of its claim to the endowments beneﬁtting the second
generation, which in turn transmits a claim to its successor, and so on. In
the present context, the income-redistribution effect amounts to the share
of claims on human capital not received by adults at time zero, and the
impact of such policies on long-run growth and welfare depends on the
interplay between physical capital accumulation, time-reallocation
effects, and knowledge transmission. From a policymaking perspective,
the rationale for such policies would hinge on the possibility that the
government is able to sterilize the welfare loss for adults at time zero. In
this regard, the assumption of a balanced public budget is crucial, since
the ﬁrst-father problem arises as long as ﬁrst-period education at time zero
must be ﬁnanced at time zero. This suggests a powerful role for the use of
public debt: for example, the government may run positive debt at time
zero to ﬁnance initial spending, and then smooth service repayments over
time according to a calibrated ﬁscal rule. Whether debt policy rules for
intergenerational ﬁscal fairness are compatible with socially optimal
growth rates may be an interesting topic for future research.
4 Conclusions
This paper analyzed the effects of alternative tax policies on growth
and welfare in a model with knowledge transmission and labor-
Growth-improving
Ramsey-optimal
Labor-neutral
Private system
α = 0.4
Ut Private Lab-Neutral Growth-Imp. Ramsey-Opt
l
X
θ
ρ
z
yss
ϕss
0.902 0.902
0.032 0.040 0.031
0.893 0.876
–
–
–5.6%
7.4%
7.4%
6.4%5.9%5.9%
39.0%
14.9% 4.0% –21.9%
0.016
0.1270.1760.2000.180
1.029 1.087 1.105 1.088
t
Fig. 3. Time paths of lifetime utility under different tax policies with b ¼ 0:8,
e ¼ g ¼ 0:5, K0 ¼ 10, h0 ¼ 1, and W ¼ 230. Values for the private system,
Ramsey-optimal and labor-neutral policies are the same as in Fig. 1 – graph (a), now
compared with the growth-improving policy ~h ¼ 4%
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enhancing public investment. Fiscal policy affects growth and welfare
through two channels: the relation between learning and public
expenditures, and time-reallocation effects induced by variations in
prospective tax rates. These two mechanisms imply an inverted-U
relation between long-run growth and second-period tax rates, so that a
generic growth rate can be obtained by means of opposite ﬁnancing
strategies: ‘‘taxing adults’’ or ‘‘taxing the young’’. Under Ramsey-
optimal policies, the education burden falls on young workers,
reducing the saving rate and crowding out physical capital. Conse-
quently, Ramsey-optimal strategies for ﬁnancing public education may
reduce growth and long-run welfare with respect to a pure private
system, depending on the relative importance of physical capital in
production. Alternative policies that shift the burden onto adults in-
stead protect the welfare of all generations. On the one hand, there
always exists a labor-neutral policy under which growth and welfare
are unambiguously higher than under the private system, by virtue of
the crowding-in mechanism. On the other hand, there generally exists a
continuum of non-optimal tax rates under which long-run growth and
welfare are higher than with the Ramsey-optimal policy.
More generally, this paper studied how the relation between taxation
and growth is inﬂuenced by the assumption of labor-enhancing educa-
tional expenditures: most previous literature emphasised the time-real-
location effects induced by distortionary income taxation, using models
where crowding-in mechanisms play a minor role. But crowding-in ef-
fects are important when educational expenditures affect learning, be-
cause knowledge transmission ampliﬁes the effectiveness of policies that
increase the disposable income of savers. In particular, if the ﬁrst gen-
eration renounces part of its claims on human capital, crowding-in effects
sustain economic growth and welfare in the long run.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1 and Lemma 2
Substituting the ﬁrst-order condition (10) in the accumulation rule (13),
the dynamics of ‘At are described by
‘Atþ1 ¼ eqA
‘At
1 ‘At
 pA;
250 S. Valente
where qA ¼ bð1 aÞðaþ abÞ1, and pA ¼ 1þ ð1þ bgÞð1 aÞ
ðaþ abÞ1. This expression is analogous to (25): since qB and pB are
constant when ht ¼ h in each period, Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 can be
proved by studying the generic dynamic equation
‘tþ1 ¼ eq ‘t
1 ‘t  p: ðA.1Þ
Taking the limits on the right-hand side of (A.1) we obtain lim
‘t!0
‘tþ1 ¼ p
and lim
‘t!1
‘tþ1 ¼ þ1, that imply the existence of a stationary solution
‘tþ1 ¼ ‘t. Rewriting (A.1) as ‘tþ1 ¼  u‘t=ut
 
q‘t  p, the derivative of
the right-hand side with respect to ‘t is
v ‘tð Þ ¼ @‘tþ1
@‘t
¼ q u‘t
ut
þ ‘t
u‘t‘t
ut
 	
 ‘t
u‘t
ut
 	2" #
> 0;
implying that the stationary equilibrium ‘? is unique. Setting ‘tþ1 ¼ ‘t in
(A.1) gives a second-order equation in ‘ with two roots of opposite sign:
since p > 1, the positive root is ‘? as deﬁned by Eqs. (14) and (28).
Evaluating v ‘tð Þ at ‘t ¼ ‘? gives
v ‘?ð Þ ¼ p þ ‘?
‘?
 q‘?
u‘t‘t
ut
 u‘t
ut
 	2" #
> 1þ p
‘?
> 1;
hence work time displays unstable dynamics outside the stationary
equilibrium ‘?. Consequently, work time jumps at the optimal level ‘? in
period zero and is constant thereafter.
Proof of Proposition 3
Since qB and pB depend on the tax rate on adult generations, optimal work
time in the public regime is a function of h. To simplify notation, we
deﬁne C ¼ 1 h and study the function ‘B? ðCÞ. Setting X ¼ 1 eqB pB
we can write, by (28),
‘B? ¼ ð1=2Þ Xþ
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
ðXÞ2 þ 4pB
q 
; ðA.2Þ
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which implies
@‘B?
@C
¼ 1
2
XC þ 2XCXþ 4p
B
C
2
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
X2 þ 4pB
p
 !
; ðA.3Þ
where pBC ¼ @pB=@C > 0 and XC ¼ @X=@C < 0. We ﬁrstly prove that ‘B?
decreases with C. The proof is by contradiction: assume that
@‘B? =@C > 0: by (A.3), this requires (recalling that XC < 0)
Xþ
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
ðXÞ2 þ 4pB
q
< 2 pBC=XC
 
: ðA.4Þ
Evaluating pBC and XC on the basis of (26)–(27) gives
 p
B
C
XC
¼ 1
1þ be : ðA.5Þ
Substituting (A.5) and 2‘B? ¼ Xþ
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
ðXÞ2 þ 4pB
q
in (A.4) yields
‘B? <
1
1þ be ;
which is absurd because it violates (29). Therefore @‘B? =@C < 0, i.e.,
‘B? increases with h. From (26), (27) and (A.2), we have limC!0
‘B? ¼ 1.
Taking the limit as C !1 it can also be shown that lim
C!1
‘B? ¼ ‘Bmin,
which completes the proof of property (i). Property (ii) derives from
property (i): since ‘B? decreases monotonically from 1 to ‘
B
min as C goes
from 0 to þ1, there is a unique intersection ‘B? ¼ ‘A? (the intersection
exists because ‘A? > ‘
A
min > ‘
B
min). As regards property (iv), when C ¼ 1
(that is, when h ¼ 0), we have qA  qB ¼ q, and optimal work time in
the two economies differs only because pA > pB: if @‘i?=@p
i > 0, we
can conclude that ‘A? > ‘
B
? . Evaluating @‘
i
?=@p
i and substituting (A.1)
in the resulting expression gives
1 ‘i?
  ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1 eq pið Þ2þ4pi
q 1
> 0;
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hence ‘B? < ‘
A
? when h ¼ 0. Property (iii) is a corollary: since @‘B?=@h > 0,
a strictly positive value h ¼ h is required to obtain ‘B? ¼ ‘A? .
Ramsey-optimal Policy
The Ramsey problem is to maximise (40) subject to (1)–(2) and (41).
Setting the Lagrangean
P ¼
X1
t¼0
n
nUt log ct þ b log dtþ1ð Þ þ kht htW 1 ‘tð ÞeEgt  htþ1½ þ
kKt K
a
t h
1a
t 1þ ‘tð Þ1anct  ndt  Etht  Ktþ1
h io
;
where kht and k
K
t are multipliers attached to human and physical capital
transition laws, respectively, optimality conditions for an interior solution
read
kKtþ1d

tþ1 ¼ kKt bct ; ðA.6Þ
Rtþ1k
K
tþ1 ¼ kKt ; ðA.7Þ
kht u

t ¼ kht1  kKt wt 1þ ‘t
  Et
 
; ðA.8Þ
kKt w

t ¼ u‘tkht ; ðA.9Þ
kKt ¼ uEtkht ; ðA.10Þ
where wt and R

t indicate optimal marginal productivities. From (A.8)
and (42), the Ramsey-optimal allocation requires
kht1 ¼ kKt ð1 aÞyt 1þ ‘t  ðg=eÞ 1 ‘tð Þ  ut=u‘t
  
;
which implies
kht1Ht
kKt1Kt
¼ 1 a
a
1þ ‘t  ge 1 ‘tð Þ 
ut
u‘t
 	
: ðA.11Þ
Substituting (A.9) in (22) we obtain
1 htþ1
1 xt ¼
a
1 a 
kht Htþ1
kKt Ktþ1
: ðA.12Þ
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Setting (A.11) one period later and substituting (A.12) gives condition
(44) in the text.
Proof of Proposition 4
Substituting (48) in (45) gives
h ¼ /g /ðeþ gÞ  e½ ‘
B
?
e ‘B? þ /
  : ðA.13Þ
We prove inequality (49) by showing that h < h. The proof is by con-
tradiction: supposing h  h, Proposition 3 would imply
‘Amin < ‘
A
?  ‘B? hð Þ; ðA.14Þ
and, since h > 0, also h must be strictly positive: by (A.13), this requires
‘B? h
ð Þ  /g
/gþ eð/ 1Þ : ðA.15Þ
Combining (A.13) with (A.15) and substituting ‘Amin by (15) gives
1þ bg
1þ beþ bg <
/g
/gþ eð/ 1Þ ;
which reduces to
/ < 1þ bg: ðA.16Þ
Substituting / by (48) and rearranging terms gives
‘B? h
ð Þ > 1 g egb
1 g e ; ðA.17Þ
which is absurd because e > egb implies that the right-hand side of
(A.17) is greater than unity. This proves that h < h, which implies
‘A? > ‘
B
? h
ð Þ. This in turn implies q > qA by virtue of Eqs. (16) and (38).
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Substituting consumers’ ﬁrst-order conditions, respectively, in (8)–(9) and
(19)–(20), optimal levels of ﬁrst-period consumption are cAt ¼ fAYt and
cBt ¼ fBYt, where
fA ¼ dð1 aÞ
1þ b
1 g ð1 egÞ‘A
ne 1þ d‘Að Þ
 	
; ðA.18Þ
fB ¼ dð1 aÞ
eð1þ bÞ
1 ‘Bt ð1 eÞ
1þ d‘
 
ð1 xÞ; ðA.19Þ
and, by (9) and (20), second-period consumption is
ditþ1 ¼ ab Y it =Kitþ1
 
fiY itþ1; i ¼ A;B: ðA.20Þ
Setting Kitþ1=Y
i
t ¼ ~zi, Eqs. (17) and (30) imply ~zi ¼ ziW 1 ‘i?
 e
qið Þg.
Using this result and substituting (A.18)–(A.20) in (7), lifetime utility
may be written as
Uit ¼ log fi þ b log ab fi=~zi
 þ log Y it þ b log ~ziY it
 a
Hitþ1
 1a
; ðA.21)
where the last term derives from Ytþ1 ¼ Katþ1H1atþ1 . Substituting
log Y it ¼ log kitþ1 þ logHitþ1  log~zi in (A.21) yields
Uit ¼ ð1þ bÞ log
fi
~zi
 	
þ b log abþ ð1þ abÞ log kitþ1
þ ð1þ bÞ log Hitþ1
 
:
ðA.22Þ
From (3), Hitþ1 ¼ Hi0
Qt
j¼0 u
i
j: substituting this expression in (A.22) gives
Eq. (36) in the text, where static terms equal
KA ¼ b log abð1 aÞ þ log 1 g ‘
A
? ð1 e gÞ
‘A? ð1þ bgþ beÞ  1 bg
 1þb
HA0
 1þb
;
KB ¼ b log abð1 aÞ þ log 1 ð1 eÞ‘
B
?
‘B? ð1þ beÞ  1
 1þb
HB0
 1þb
:
Tax Policy and Human Capital Formation with Public 255
Proof of Proposition 6
By Proposition 3, ‘A? ¼ ‘B? ðhÞ ¼ ‘?, and, by (16) and (38), qA ¼ qB
ðhÞ ¼ q. From (18) and (31), we obtain
zA
zB
¼ ‘?ð1þ bgþ beÞ  1 bg
‘?ð1þ beÞ  1½ ð1 xÞ : ðA.23Þ
Substituting (34) and (35) in the left-hand side of (A.23) gives
h ¼ gb 1 ‘?ð Þ ‘?ð1þ beÞ  1½ 1> 0: (A.24)
We now prove that x < 0. From (39), x‘? ¼ 1 ‘?ð Þ ge  h: substituting
(A.24) in this expression implies that x > 0 only if
‘?ð1þ beÞ > 1þ be; (A.25)
which is absurd since ‘? < 1. Therefore, young generations are subsi-
dised. Since h > 0 > x, it derives from (34)–(35) that zB > zA. This im-
plies, by (32), that yBss > y
A
ss and k
B
ss > k
A
ss. Consequently, school quality is
asymptotically higher in the public regime (qyBss > qy
A
ss), implying higher
long-run growth:
W 1 ‘?ð Þe qyAss
 g¼ uAss < uBss ¼ W 1 ‘?ð Þe qyBss
 g
: (A.26)
As regards welfare, it follows from (37) that uAss < u
B
ss implies U
A
t < U
B
t
at least in the long run.
Proof of Proposition 7
Substituting (38) in (35) and taking the ratio between accumulation rates
under growth-equivalent and Ramsey-optimal policies yields
zB hnð Þ
zB hð Þ ¼
1 ‘B? hnð Þ
1 ‘B? hð Þ
 	1eg
1 x hnð Þ
1 hn 
1 h
1 x hð Þ
 
: (A.27)
Given h < hn, the term in square brackets in (A.27) is always greater
than unity because the tax ratio increases with h. If eþ g ¼ 1 the ﬁrst
term reduces to 1, implying zB hnð Þ > zB hð Þ. If eþ g < 1, the whole
expression exceeds unity provided the work time gap ‘B? h
nð Þ  ‘B? hnð Þ is
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sufﬁciently low. Analogous reasoning yields yBss h
nð Þ > yBss hð Þ in the
respective cases, because yBss is an increasing function of z
B by (32).
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